Honeypot Detection: Commercial Threat Intel Mapping (ONYPHE)
Systematic scan on 9770/TCP with banner grab and controlled RST
9770/TCP
Target Port
AS213412
ONYPHE SAS
~98 ms
Interaction Time
Executive Summary
Suricata detected internet-wide reconnaissance by ONYPHE (commercial scanner). The probe executed a clean TCP handshake, captured a banner, and immediately reset — classic cataloging behavior for sale in a commercial database. While not malicious per se, this activity enables both defenders and adversaries.
Observation Timeline
Detection
Suricata flagged inbound probe to 9770/TCP
- Event triaged
- Session reconstructed
- Confirmed banner grab + RST
Attribution
IP linked to ONYPHE SAS (AS213412), known commercial scanner
- ASN + org lookups
- Checked existing sightings in TI feeds
- Tagged as “mass scanner”
Assessment
Non-targeted internet-wide enumeration; low immediate risk but high OSINT impact
- Categorized as mapping activity
- Evaluated exposure of deception fingerprints
Response
Implemented scanner-specific responses and tracking
- Decoy banner rotation enabled
- Honeytoken beacon prepared
- Correlation alert created
Scan Characteristics
- • Target port: 9770/TCP (non-standard, high-entropy)
- • Connection: TCP SYN → banner grab → immediate RST
- • Duration: ~98ms total interaction time
- • Bytes: ~128 sent / 74 received
- • Behavior: Clean handshake with controlled termination
Scanner Infrastructure
- • Organization: ONYPHE SAS — commercial threat intelligence provider
- • Network: AS213412; traffic observed from 91.231.89.129 (OVH/Gravelines region)
- • Reputation: Labeled “mass scanner” across multiple threat feeds
- • Model: Sells access to discovered services, banners, certificates
The Researcher Paradox
- • Legally operated scanners mirror attacker recon behavior
- • Blocking them can reduce researcher visibility while attackers still find paths
- • Their datasets can be purchased by threat actors (“reconnaissance-as-a-service”)
Strategic Recommendations
- • Respond with decoy banners or delayed/variable responses to pollute commercial datasets
- • Correlate scans with later targeted traffic; raise priority when correlation exists
- • Use honeytokens that only appear after indexing — detect downstream consumption
- • Segment deception infra so cataloging doesn’t reveal production fingerprints
Consider sharing noisy decoy intel to dilute value while tracking reuse.
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