Honeypot Detection: Sophisticated VoIP Toll Fraud
Sentrypeer + Suricata capture INVITE floods from GoDaddy (AS398101)
SIP INVITE / UDP 5060
Protocol / Port
GoDaddy AS398101
Source ASN
819-byte INVITE
Payload Size
High ($$ Fraud)
Risk
Executive Summary
My T-Pot honeypot observed an aggressive VoIP toll-fraud campaign from 208.109.190.200 (GoDaddy/AS398101). The attacker used legitimate-looking SIP fingerprints (“Cisco-SIPGateway”), sequential international targets, and full SDP negotiation — a hallmark of professional revenue-share fraud targeting misconfigured PBX systems.
Incident Timeline
Detection
Sentrypeer + Suricata triggered on SIP INVITE bursts
- Flagged anomalous volume to 5060/UDP
 - Correlated User-Agent + SDP length
 - Enabled packet capture
 
Attribution
Source 208.109.190.200 (GoDaddy/AS398101) — likely compromised VPS
- ASN + geo lookup
 - Checked Abuse/Whois contacts
 - Searched for prior fraud reports
 
Analysis
Confirmed toll-fraud tradecraft and premium-rate targets
- Parsed full SIP/SDP; verified SDP codecs and call intent
 - Recognized sequential premium number patterns
 - Classified as professional toll-fraud campaign
 
Response
Shared IOCs; tuned throttling and decoy behavior
- Rate-limited INVITE handling at sensor
 - Filed abuse report to provider; submitted to AbuseIPDB
 - Wrote detection notes for PBX defenders
 
Attack Profile
- • SIP INVITE floods over UDP/5060
 - • Persistence via varying source ports (50352, 52392, 56775)
 - • Target numbers with sequential international patterns (0075346850780296, 76000046850780294)
 - • Spoofed User-Agent: “Cisco-SIPGateway” to mimic legitimate equipment
 - • Full SDP negotiation; established bidirectional UDP flows
 
Methodology & Intent
- • International premium route abuse: 760/007 indicate high-tariff destinations
 - • Compromised/misconfigured PBX sought for unauthorized call placement
 - • Signature evasion using legitimate vendor fingerprints
 - • Systematic dial of sequential number ranges to find billable routes
 
Real-World Impact
- • Toll fraud can generate $50k-$200k in hours — carriers often hold victims liable.
 - • Legit infrastructure abuse (GoDaddy VPS) complicates IP-based blocking.
 - • Whitelisted vendor strings (“Cisco-SIPGateway”) help bypass naive defenses.
 
Recommendations
- • Disable unauthenticated SIP on the public internet; restrict by IP where possible.
 - • Enforce outbound call rules (destinations, max concurrency, price caps).
 - • Alert on vendor strings in unexpected contexts and sequential international dialing.
 - • Deploy honeypot SIP listeners (e.g., Sentrypeer) to surface fraud early.
 
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