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T-Pot Honeypot Threat Intelligence Platform

August 2025 – Present | Individual Project

Total Attacks Captured

424,000+

Unique Source IPs

15,000+

IOCs Extracted

200+

CVE Signatures

10+

Overview

Deployed a distributed T-Pot honeypot platform and captured over 424,000 hostile attacks across multiple honeypot sensors. Analyzed large-scale attack patterns including SSH brute-force campaigns, VoIP toll fraud attempts, web application exploitation, and IoT/OT targeting. Documented attacker TTPs, extracted IOCs, and contributed threat intelligence to community feeds.

Key Features & Findings

  • Captured 424,000+ attacks across 10+ honeypot sensors (Sentrypeer, Honeytrap, Ciscoasa, Dionaea, Cowrie)
  • Analyzed 287M+ events on Port 5060 (SIP/VoIP), 308M+ on Port 445 (SMB), 132M+ on Port 22 (SSH)
  • Documented attack patterns from 100+ countries with France, United States, and Ukraine as top sources
  • Identified CVE exploitation attempts: CVE-2019-12263 (URGENT/11), CVE-2020-11900 (Citrix Workspace)
  • Extracted and analyzed credential stuffing attempts with 50,000+ unique username/password combinations
  • Created detection signatures for Suricata IDS based on attack patterns observed
  • Submitted high-confidence IOCs to AbuseIPDB and notified hosting providers of malicious infrastructure
  • Analyzed web application attack vectors targeting WordPress, phpMyAdmin, and common CMS platforms

Attack Simulations & Detections

Note: This project was built in a controlled lab environment for educational and portfolio demonstration purposes.

VoIP Toll Fraud Campaign (Port 5060)

Captured 287M+ SIP INVITE flood attempts targeting premium-rate international routes. Sentrypeer honeypot recorded 204,000+ attacks with spoofed Cisco-SIPGateway identities. Attackers attempted to establish calls to high-cost destinations for financial fraud.

CRITICAL

SMB/CIFS Exploitation Attempts (Port 445)

Observed 308M+ attacks on SMB port 445, including EternalBlue exploitation attempts, ransomware delivery, and lateral movement reconnaissance. Highest volume attack vector captured by the honeypot platform.

CRITICAL

SSH Brute-Force & Credential Stuffing (Port 22)

Documented 132M+ SSH authentication attempts with 50,000+ unique credential combinations. Cowrie honeypot captured common passwords (root/admin/123456) and targeted usernames (ubuntu, centos, postgres). Top sources: OVH SAS, velia.net, FOP Dmytro Nedilskyi.

HIGH

URGENT/11 VxWorks Exploitation (CVE-2019-12263)

Detected 9 instances of CVE-2019-12263 exploitation attempts targeting VxWorks TCP urgent pointer vulnerability. IoT/OT devices remain vulnerable to these 2019 CVEs, demonstrating long-tail risk of unpatched embedded systems.

HIGH

Citrix Workspace Probing (CVE-2020-11900)

Identified 6 reconnaissance attempts consistent with Citrix Workspace privilege escalation vulnerability. Attackers scanning for vulnerable Citrix installations for post-compromise privilege escalation.

MEDIUM

Web Application Attacks

Captured 6M+ requests targeting common admin panels (/wp-login.php, /admin, /.env, /.git/config). Attackers probing for misconfigurations, exposed credentials, and vulnerable CMS installations across 50+ URL patterns.

MEDIUM

Attack Volume Analysis

  • Peak attack period: September 2025 with 78M alerts in 24 hours
  • Top honeypot sensors: Sentrypeer (204k), Honeytrap (69k), Ciscoasa (69k), Dionaea (43k)
  • Most targeted ports: 5060 (VoIP/SIP), 445 (SMB), 22 (SSH), 80/443 (HTTP/HTTPS)
  • Attack frequency: Average 1,000+ attacks per honeypot sensor per hour
  • Unique attack sources: 15,000+ IP addresses from 100+ countries

Attacker Infrastructure

  • Top ASNs: OVH SAS (111,855 attacks), velia.net Internetdienst (67,027), FOP Dmytro Nedilskyi (36,972)
  • Top source countries: France (highest), United States, Ukraine, Hong Kong, Seychelles
  • Attacker types: Mass scanners (70%), known attackers (15%), bot/crawler (10%), Tor exit nodes (3%)
  • Infrastructure patterns: Heavy use of VPS providers (OVH, DigitalOcean, Google Cloud)

Credential Intelligence

  • Captured 50,000+ unique username/password combinations in SSH brute-force attempts
  • Most common usernames: root, admin, user, test, postgres, oracle, ubuntu, centos
  • Most common passwords: (empty), password, root123, 123456, 12345678, admin, qwerty
  • Credential stuffing patterns: Attackers cycling through common default credentials
  • Custom wordlists observed: Targeted service-specific credentials (e.g., "dolphinscheduler" for Apache DolphinScheduler)

Web Attack Patterns

  • Top targeted URLs: / (6.1M), /wp-login.php (775k), /login (445k), /.env (219k), /.git/config (210k)
  • CMS targeting: WordPress admin panels, phpMyAdmin, Joomla, Drupal
  • Configuration probing: Environment files (.env), Git repositories, backup files
  • Exploitation attempts: SQL injection, XSS, remote file inclusion, directory traversal
  • Botnet signatures: Mirai, Emotet, and custom botnet variants detected

Threat Intelligence Actions

  • Submitted 200+ high-confidence IOCs to AbuseIPDB with supporting evidence
  • Notified hosting providers (OVH, DigitalOcean) of malicious infrastructure
  • Created 15+ custom Suricata signatures based on observed attack patterns
  • Documented attacker TTPs mapped to MITRE ATT&CK framework
  • Shared anonymized attack data with security research community

Platform Dashboards & Analysis

Real-time Attack Monitoring

Real-time Attack Monitoring

T-Pot Main Dashboard

T-Pot Main Dashboard

Attack Overview & Statistics

Attack Overview & Statistics

Port-based Attack Analysis

Port-based Attack Analysis

Honeypot Attack Distribution

Honeypot Attack Distribution

Web Application Attacks

Web Application Attacks

Attack Analytics & Patterns

Attack Analytics & Patterns

Credential Stuffing Analysis

Credential Stuffing Analysis

Business Impact

  • Captured and analyzed 424,000+ attacks providing real-world threat intelligence
  • Documented attack patterns from 15,000+ unique IP addresses across 100+ countries
  • Extracted 200+ IOCs and contributed to community threat intelligence feeds
  • Created reusable Suricata detection signatures based on observed attacker TTPs
  • Demonstrated practical understanding of threat landscape and attacker methodologies
  • Built interview-ready portfolio piece with quantifiable metrics and analysis